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THE SUITS IN ADMIRALTY ACT AND THE
IMPLIED DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
The Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA)I was enacted in 1920 as a nar-
row waiver of the United States's sovereign immunity for admiralty
claims arising from the use of government-owned ships as merchant
vessels.2 In 1960 Congress amended the SIAA 3 in an effort to resolve
the nagging jurisdictional problem of the proper forum for a complaint
that contains both admiralty and contract elements. 4 This apparently
innocuous amendment also attempted to eliminate confusion over the
meaning of the terms "employed as a merchant vessel" and "public
vessel," 5 terms which respectively determined whether an action may
be brought under the SIAA or its sister act, the Public Vessels Act
(PVA).6 This latter change removed language restricting causes of ac-
tion under the SIAA to damages caused by a government vessel em-
ployed as a merchant vessel and inserted language that extended
coverage of the SIAA to all admiralty causes of action that could be
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976).
2. The relevant portion of the original Act provided:
That in cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo
were privately owned and possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained at
the time of the commencement of the action herein provided for, a libel in personam
may be brought against the United States or against such corporation [in which the
United States or its representatives own all outstanding capital stock], as the case may be,
provided that such vessel is employed as a merchant vessel or is a tug boat operated by
such corporation. Such suits shall be brought in the district court of the United States
Suits in Admiralty Act, Pub. L. No. 66-156, § 2, 41 Stat. 525-26 (1920) (current version at 46
U.S.C. § 742 (1976)).
3. See Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-770, § 3, 74 Stat. 912 (amending 46 U.S.C. § 742
(1958)).
4. See notes 73-79 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 80-83 infra and accompanying text.
6. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1976). Five years after the passage of the SIAA, which applied
only to ships employed as merchant vessels, Congress enacted the PVA, an analogous statute deal-
ing with claims for damage caused by public vessels, such as warships, Coast Guard vessels, and
other ships not involved in the merchant trade. The two statutes are similar but not identical. For
example, there is a difference in venue and in interest-accrual provisions. Compare 46 U.S.C.
§§ 742, 743 (1976) with id § 782. Additionally, the PVA includei some restrictions that are not a
part of the SIAA, such as limitations on subpoenas directed to crew members of public vessels and
reciprocity requirements for suits brought by foreign nationals. See id §§ 784-785. To the extent
the acts are not inconsistent, however, the SIAA and the PVA should be read in conjunction with
one another. See United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 181 (1976);
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446, 455 (1953); Blanco v. United States, 464 F.
Supp. 927, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 46 U.S.C. § 782 (1976).
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brought against a private person or his property.7 The majority of
courts that have considered this change has concluded that the amend-
ment dramatically expands the coverage of the SIAA to include all
maritime torts, not just those involving merchant vessels.8
As a result of the decisions allowing this broader coverage, the
SIAA now embraces in its admiralty jurisdiction tort claims against the
government that previously could have been brought only under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).9 Additionally, because the FTCA
specifically excludes claims cognizable under the SIAA and the PVA °,
these two statutes are now the exclusive vehicles for bringing such tort
suits. Confusion has returned, however, as courts attempt to outline
the limits of the government's waiver of sovereign immunity for those
maritime torts formerly covered by the FTCA that are now covered by
the SIAA. Specifically, neither the SIAA nor the PVA contain an ex-
plicit exemption from the waiver of sovereign immunity for discretion-
ary functions-generally, those governmental decisions involving some
degree of policy making11 made by nonjudicial officials-as does the
FTCA. 12 This comment considers the question of whether the SIAA
contains an implied discretionary-function exemption and concludes
that it does.
This conclusion is supported by the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers and the legislative history of the SIAA, the PVA, and the 1960
amendments to the SIAA. The separation of powers doctrine recog-
7. The amended statute reads:
In cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo were
privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a pro-
ceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in per-
sonam may be brought against the United States ....
46 U.S.C. § 742 (1976).
8. See cases cited in note 88 infra.
9. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. iv, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 28, 31, 33 U.S.C.).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d). This section provides that the FTCA does not apply to "[a]ny claim
for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits
in admiralty against the United States." Id See also 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976) (a similar provision
for exclusive handling of admiralty claims under the SIAA or the PVA).
11. For a discussion of the meaning of the discretionary-function exemption in the FTCA,
see 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TRATISE § 25.08-.13 (1958 & Supp. 1970); Matthews,
Federal Tort Claims Ac-The Proper Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception, 6 AM. U.L.
REv. 22 (1957); Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57
GEO. LU. 81 (1968); Zillman, The Changing Meanings of Discretion" Evolution in the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 76 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1977). See generally L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS: ADMNISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1981).
12. Compare 46 U.S.C. §§ 742, 746, 781, 787 (1976) with 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). For the
text of the discretionary-function exemption in the FTCA, see text accompanying note 104 infra.
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nizes the limits of judicial power to review the discretionary 3 decisions
of a coordinate branch of government absent congressional authoriza-
tion. The legislative history of the acts and the amendments reveal a
dearth of material concerning Congress's intent in broadening the cov-
erage of the SIAA in the 1960 amendments. There was no clear recog-
nition that the amendment would substantially affect the handling of
maritime tort claims. 14 It is appropriate, therefore, to treat such claims
as they were treated under the FTCA, before the 1960 SIAA
amendments. 15
I. THE DIFFERING JUDICIAL CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE
IMPLIED DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION ExEMPrION
Under the generally accepted view of sovereign immunity, the
United States may not be sued absent its consent. 16 Consent is ordina-
rily achieved through statutes waiving immunity for certain actions.17
When presented with a broad waiver of immunity,18 courts necessarily
13. For the purposes of this comment it is assumed that the discretionary-function exemption
refers to decisions that are primarily policy-making, such as decisions implementing programs or
setting priorities for determining the proper allocation of an agency's resources. See note 11 supra
and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 122-25 infra.
14. See notes 73-88 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 101-125 infra and accompanying text. There are three ways to analyze whether
an implied discretionary-function exemption exists in the SIAA. The first approach reasons that
because no restrictions on the waiver of sovereign immunity appear on the face of the statute, the
statute should be taken as a complete waiver of immunity. See notes 19-24 infra and accompany-
ing text. The second approach includes in the analysis a consideration of the legislative history
and the separation of powers doctrine, factors that support inferring a discretionary-function ex-
emption into the SIAA. See notes 25-36 infra and accompanying text. The third method narrowly
construes the revised SIAA, confining the Act to its pre-1960 role of resolving shipping claims.
This interpretation, recently advanced in McCormick v. United States, 645 F.2d 259 (5th Cir.
1981), focuses primarily on the legislative history of the 1960 SIAA amendments and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of that history in United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S.
164 (1976). Under this approach nonshipping-maritime torts are still covered by the FTCA. 645
F.2d at 303-07, 309-10. This analysis eliminates the need to decide whether the SIAA contains an
implied discretionary-function exemption for maritime torts previously covered by the FTCA.
This comment focuses on the first two approaches. It does so for two reasons. First, the
predominant view of the courts is that the 1960 amendments did expand the coverage of the Act to
include all maritime torts. Second, the McCormick approach parallels the second approach men-
tioned above in its emphasis on the legislative history and, by recognizing FTCA coverage of
nonshipping maritime torts, has the same practical effect of affording the discretionary-function
protection to the government.
16. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 586-87 (1941); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940).
17. See, e-., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141-43 (1972); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 503 (1940);
Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 41 (1938).
18. An example of broad wording is the "private person or property" language in the SIAA,
46 U.S.C. § 742 (1976). See note 3 supra.
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have considerable latitude in defining the precise limits of the waiver.
The decisions interpreting the scope of the waiver of immunity in the
SIAA illustrate the variation that results.
In Lane v. United States19 a motorboat owner who had struck an
unmarked, sunken barge alleged that the Coast Guard was negligent in
failing to mark the barge. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
took a direct approach in concluding that there was no implied discre-
tionary-function exemption in the SIAA. The court simply noted that
the language of the SIAA differs from that of the FTCA in that the
SIAA contains no explicit exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. Hence, the court reasoned that there is "no basis" for importing
the exceptions of the FTCA into the SIAA.20 The Lane opinion offers
no extensive analysis of the SIAA or of waivers of sovereign immunity
in general. It does demonstrate, however, one approach to interpreting
statutes waiving sovereign immunity: the waiver is given the broadest
interpretation consistent with the language of the statute.21
A similar expansive reading of statutory waivers of immunity is
evident in DeBardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States.22 Although the
DeBardeleben court did not decide the specific question of whether the
SIAA contained an implied discretionary-function exemption,2 3 it
19. 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975).
20. Id at 179.
21. Although irrelevant to its interpretation of the SIAA, the court determined that under the
Wreck Act, 14 U.S.C. § 86 (1976), the Coast Guard's decisions about marking sunken wrecks were
discretionary but that such discretion must be exercised responsibly. 529 F.2d at 179. The court
concluded: "[The Coast Guard] is ndt to ignore submerged wrecks of which [they are] informed,
or fail to mark them if they constitute real dangers to navigation.' Id at 179. The court's zeal in
interpreting this supposedly discretionary duty may be due in part to proof that eight to ten plea-
sure boats a year had run up on the wreck for each of the five years the wreck had been unmarked.
See id at 177. It is interesting to compare this view of discretion with the discretionary-function
exemption in the FTCA, which states specifically that.the exemption applies "whether or not the
discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
The problem with adopting a strict standard of review of the exercise of discretion, as the
Lane court advocates, is that the immunity becomes illusory. Justice Rehnquist cogently articu-
lated this dilemma in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). That case involved the scope of a
government official's immunity from suit for a constitutional tort. The majority held that the
Secretary of Agriculture has only a qualified immunity from suit for a constitutional wrong. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, noted: "[The majority's opinion] amounts to saying that
an official has immunity until someone alleges that he acted unconstitutionally. But that is no
immunity at all: The 'immunity' disappears at the very moment it is needed." Id at 520.
22. 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971).
23. In DeBardeleben the court had to decide the analogous question of whether'to incorpo-
rate another of the FTCA's specific exemptions-that for the tort of misrepresentation-into the
SIAA. Tugboat and barge owners, whose vesseis were damaged when a natural gas pipeline rup-
tured and exploded after an anchor had caught on it, claimed that the government was guilty of
misrepresentation in supplying an improperly updated chart that did not reflect the presence of
the pipeline. Id at 141-42. The court refused to imply any of the FTCA's exemptions into the
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stated that because the historical trend is away from sovereign immu-
nity, "[a]ny doubts as to its waiver ... are to be resolved against the
sovereign." 24
A different judicial disposition toward the interpretation of immu-
nity statutes is present in Gercey v. UnitedStates.25 In Gercey the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit held that there is an implied discretion-
ary-function exemption in the SIAA, reasoning that courts should be
circumspect about reviewing administrative and legislative policy deci-
sions absent specific authorization from Congress. 26 The court con-
cluded that if the judiciary becomes too embroiled in policy decisions
concerning the use of limited resources for the public interest, an "in-
tolerable state of affairs" would result.27 A close reading of the court's
opinion reveals a deference to the doctrine of separation of powers;
specifically, a respect for the policy decisions properly made by the
other branches of government. The court confined its deference, how-
ever, to those policy judgments affecting the public interest.23
SIAA. Id at 145-46. Even though the court rejected most of the government's legal arguments,
the government still won the case because the government owed no duty to the users of the old
chart after it had issued two notices that stated that a new, up-to-date chart had been issued.
24. Id at 143. In a footnote, the court sought to support its argument by noting that the
discretionary-function exemption also should not be imported into the SIAA. It reasoned that the
government's operation of a warship is purely discretionary and that the government has accepted
liability in cases arising from damage caused by its warships. Id at 146 n.15.
Two observations on this point are in order. First, the court was referring to the waiver of
immunity in the PVA, not the SIAA, although it did not acknowledge that fact. Second, this
rationale assumes that any operation of a warship is a discretionary act. This assumption defines
discretion so broadly that it would include every decision made at any level by a government
employee; generally, this definition has not been accepted. See note 11 supra. See Gercey v.
United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 n.4 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (the operation
of a ship "does not involve a basic policy judgment of how best to promote the public interest and,
as such, is not a 'discretionary function' ").
Although the court's subsequent decision in McCormick v. United States, 645 F.2d 299 (5th
Cir. 1981), rejected DeBardeleben's conclusion that the SIAA embraces all maritime torts, id at
309, McCormick reaflnrmed DeBardeleben's reasoning concerning sovereign immunity. Id at 309
n.18.
25. 540 F.2d 536 (1st Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977). In Gercey the claims arose
when a charter-fishing boat sank, drowning several passengers. The Coast Guard had earlier
revoked the boat's certification to carry passengers after an inspection revealed the decayed condi-
tion of the boat's hull. The owner of the boat at the time of the revocation sold it to another
operator, who started charter operations. The parents of one of the deceased passengers alleged
that the Coast Guard had been negligent in failing to ensure that the boat was not used to carry
commercial passengers. 540 F.2d at 537.
26. Id. at 539.
27. Id The Gercey court concluded that the question of whether the Coast Guard should
implement a follow-up program for decertified vessels was a discretionary matter involving a pol-
icy decision about how to use limited resources to best promote the public interest.
28. Id See also Boston Edison Co. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 423 F.2d 891, 896-97
(1st Cir. 1970) (the court implicitly acknowledged the presence of a discretionary-function exemp-
tion in the SIAA for similar reasons).
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Basing its decision largely on the doctrine of separation of powers,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found an
implied discretionary-function exemption in the SIAA in Canadian
Transport Co. v. [nited States.2 9 The court viewed the implied exemp-
tion not as "an attempt to rewrite the statute, but merely [as] an ac-
knowledgement of the limits of judicial power." 30 Additionally, the
court noted that the legislative history of the 1960 amendments to the
SIAA did not support a substantive change in the waiver of sovereign
immunity for maritime torts.3 1
The limited scope of the 1960 amendments was an important part
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Bearce v.
United States.32 The court quoted at length from Gercey33 and found
further support for a narrow reading of the 1960 amendments in the
Supreme Court's 1976 decision in United States v. United Continental
Tuna Corp. ,34 which held that the 1960 amendments to the SIAA do
not alter the jurisdictional requirements of the PVA.35 On these bases,
the court held that the SIAA contains an implied discretionary-func-
tion exemption.3 6
29. 1980 A.M.C. 2103 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In this case the shipping company alleged that the
Coast Guard had intentionally interfered with its contract rights by invoking provisions of the
seldom used Special Interest Vessel program to prohibit a freighter from entering Norfolk harbor,
an area with numerous naval facilities, until the Polish crew of the ship had been replaced by crew
members from noncommunist countries. Id at 2105-06. The district court opinion is discussed
extensively in Canadian Transport Company v. United States: An Avenue Toward a Remedyfor a
Treaty Violation, 9 CAL. W. INr' L.J. 377 (1979).
30. 1980 A.M.C. at 2110. The court in Canadian Transport also concluded that the plan-
ning/operational standard is the appropriate means to analyze whether an act or decision is cov-
ered by the discretionary-function exemption. Id at 2110-11. For further discussion of the
planning/operational standard, see notes 117-125 infra and accompanying text.
31. 1980 A.M.C. at 2108-09. For further discussion of the legislative history of the SIAA, see
notes 53-88 infra and accompanying text.
32. 614 F.2d 556 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980). Bearce was a wrongful death
action arising from a boating accident on Lake Michigan. The Coast Guard was allegedly negli-
gent in its failure to light both ends of a breakwater that marked a seldom used entrance to
Chicago harbor. 614 F.2d at 557-58.
33. Id at 559 (quoting Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 954 (1977)). Included in the material quoted was the Gercey court's consideration of the
public policy reasons for inferring the discretionary-function exemption. See notes 25-28 supra
and accompanying text.
34. 425 U.S. 164 (1976).
35. For a discussion of the facts and holding of United Continental Tuna, see notes 89-96 infra
and accompanying text.
36. 614 F.2d at 560. In Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1980),
the court adopted the reasoning of the Bearce and Gercey decisions in deciding to imply a discre-
tionary-function exemption into the SIAA. In Rappenecker the court held that the military rescue
mission to recapture the S.S. Mayaguez, after Cambodian forces had illegally seized it in interna-
tional waters, involved a basic policy judgment concerning the national interest and thus fell
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Finally, in Magno v. Corros3 7 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed a lower court decision3 8 that had held the United
States liable for a portion of the damage sustained in a motorboat's
collision with a dike.39 The court distinguished Lane v. United States,40
but did not specifically address the discretionary-function issue. The
court recognized the budgetary impact of holding the Coast Guard lia-
ble in cases that involve discretion in the placement of the navigation
aids. The court reasoned that absent a congressional mandate requir-
ing additional navigational aids "it is usually inappropriate for a fed-
eral court to impose such a requirement and in effect direct the Coast
Guard how to spend its limited resources."' 4' The court appeared to be
reconsidering the strict standards of Lane,42 expressing concern over
judicial control of the limited resources of an executive agency. This
concern is similar to the discretionary-function concept; both reflect
deferral to policy decisions concerning the allocation of resources.
Courts that have examined whether there is an implied discretion-
ary-function exemption in the SIAA43 have collectively identified the
within the discretionary-function exemption. The personal injury actions brought by former May.
apuez crewmen, therefore, were not actionable under the SIAA. Id at 1026-28.
37. 630 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
38. Magno v. Corros, 439 F. Supp. 592, (D.S.C. 1977), rev'd, 630 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
39. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found no evidence that the lack of lighting
on the dike induced the boater to believe that the dike was not in his path. Additionally, the court
noted that the government had not undertaken to light the entire length of the dike; thus, it could
not be held liable on a "Good Samaritan" theory, as it had been in Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). 630 F.2d at 228-29. In Indian Towing the Coast Guard was held liable
for damages sustained by a barge owner whose vessel grounded because of an inoperative light in
a navigation aid. The government conceded that maintenance of the light was not discretionary
and instead argued that there was no analogous private liability for failing to maintain navigation
aids, hence the FTCA did not reach such activity. 350 U.S. at 64-66. Rejecting the government's
argiment, the Court held that once the Coast Guard had undertaken to warn mariners of naviga-
tional hazards, it had to continue to do so in a careful manner, and that allowing the inoperative
light in the navigation aid to go unrepaired was negligence actionable under the FTCA. Id at 69.
40. 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975). The Magno court distinguished Lane on two grounds.
First, the court noted there was no duty to mark the dike in the first instance, for the dike was a
congressionally authorized aid to navigation and did not fall under 14 U.S.C. § 86 (1976), which
the Lane court had relied upon and which provides the Coast Guard with the authority to mark
sunken vessels or other obstructions to navigation. Second, the court found no analogous private
liability for failure to mark a dike, which supported its position that there was no duty to mark the
dike in the first place. 630 F.2d at 227-28.
41. 630 F.2d at 229.
42. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
43. In addition to the decisions previously discussed, several lower courts have also men-
tioned the issue. These courts, however, have not offered any new analysis of the topic; rather,
they merely cite to an opinion of that circuit's court of appeals and state their views in a con-
clusory fashion. See, e.g., Offshore Transp. Corp. v. United States, 465 F. Supp. 976, 981 (E.D.
La. 1979); Doyle v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 701, 709 (D.S.C. 1977); Hogge v. S.S. Yorkmar,
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principal considerations as: the statute's plain language, which con-
tains no specific exemptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity; the
doctrine of separation of powers, which fosters a judicial reluctance to
review policy decisions made by coordinate branches of government;
and the legislative histories of the SIAA and the 1960 amendments,
which lack any indication that Congress desired a substantive change
in government liability for maritime torts. The legislative history and
judicial construction of the SIAA, the PVA, and the discretionary-func-
tion exemption of the FTCA are useful in analyzing these concerns and
in deciding whether the SIAA contains a discretionary-function
exemption.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The SIA4A and the PVA.
The SIAA was enacted to alleviate the problems caused by the
federal government's operation of large numbers of merchant ships
during and after World War I. Prior to World War I, the government
was not significantly involved in merchant shipping activities. Conse-
quently, private individuals rarely needed relief for damages caused by
government vessels." When such occasions did arise, Congress re-
solved the disputes through private relief bills.45 The advent of World
War I dramatically changed this situation. Because German subma-
rines were exacting a high toll on commercial shipping, the government
became extremely active in the construction and operation of merchant
vessels. One result of the government's increased activity was an in-
creased number of claims against the government for damages caused
by government vessels.4 6
In the Shipping Act of 191647 Congress provided for the first
waiver of sovereign immunity48 covering government merchant vessels
434 F. Supp. 715, 732 n.3 (D. Md. 1977). But see Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F. Supp.
1024, 1026-28 (N.D. Cal. 1980), discussed in note 36 supra.
44. See Note, The MaritimeLiability of the United States, 100 U. PA. L. Rnv. 689, 691 (1952).
45. Id
46. Id
47. Pub. L. No. 64-260, 39 Stat. 728 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 808 (1976)).
48. The relevant portion of the statute read as follows:
That any vessel purchased, chartered, or leased from the board may be registered or
enrolled and licensed .... as a vessel of the United States and entitled to the benefits
and privileges appertaining thereto: Provided, That ... [s]uch vessels while employed
solely as merchant vessels shall be subject to all laws, regulations and liabilities gov-
erning merchant vessels, whether the United States be interested therein as owner in
whole or in part, or hold any mortgage, lien, or other interest therein.
Id at § 9, 39 Stat. at 730. The Act also provided for government shipbuilding programs and the
establishment of a government corporation to operate merchant ships.
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operated by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corpo-
ration.49 The Supreme Court, in The Lake Monroe,50 construed the
statute to be a complete waiver of immunity.51 Thus, government-
owned ships were subject to the traditional admiralty law remedies of
arrest and in rem proceedings.52
Congress disagreed with the results of the Lake Monroe holding.5 3
The problem of seizures of government vessels for in rem proceedings
had reached epidemic proportions54 and was subjecting the United
States "to unnecessary expense and its vessels to great delays. '55 To
rectify this situation, Congress passed the SIAA in 1920.56
The SIAA was narrowly drawn to reach only those ships em-
ployed as merchant vessels. It provided that only libel in personam
actions could be brought.5 7 Congress decided that the removal of the
in rem right to seize government vessels, which arose after the Lake
Monroe. decision, would alleviate the embarrassment, time, and ex-
pense to the government resulting from the detention of its ships, with-
out seriously impairing claimants' remedies because the United States
was "absolutely responsible" for its debts and could be relied on to pay
49. The Federal Maritime Commission is the modem day successor of the Emergency Fleet
Corporation.
50. 250 U.S. 246 (1919).
51. The Lake Monroe, a government owned vessel operated by a private company acting as
an agent for the Emergency Fleet Corporation, collided with a private vessel off the coast of Cape
Cod. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's interpretation of section 9 of the Shipping
Act, which provided that the United States was entitled to all the benefits and privileges of a
private owner, and held that the United States was to be subject to the same liabilities as private
individuals. Following this rationale, the Court noted that government vessels could be seized
and put in the court's custody under traditional admiralty in rem proceedings. Id at 248, 254-56.
52. Admiralty law provides for both in personam proceedings to impose personal liability on
a corporate or natural person and for in rem proceedings. The former proceedings are predicated
on the existence of a maritime lien, which arises if, for example, a ship causes damage to another
vessel or to shore fixtures. Under in rem proceedings the court arrests the vessel and holds it for
sale to satisfy the maritime liens against it, and the owner can recover control of the vessel only by
posting a bond. G. GiLMORE & C. BLAcK, THME LAW OF ADMIRALTY 34-37 (2d ed. 1975).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 497, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1919).
54. See id The report stated: "Almost daily such seizures occur, and under existing law
there is no speedy remedy for their release." Id
55. S. REP. No. 223, 66th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1919).
56. Pub. L. No. 66-156, 41 Stat. 525 (1920) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976)).
57. Pub. L. No. 66-156, 41 Stat. 525, 526 (1920). The act provided:
[fin cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such Cargo
were privately owned and possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be main-
tained .... a libel in personam may be brought against the United States or against
such corporation, as the case may be, provided that such vessel is employed as a
merchant vessel or is a tug boat operated by such corporation.
Id at 525-26.
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any judgment rendered against it.5 The congressional intent in pass-
ing the SIAA is succinctly stated in the House Report on the bill: "The
object of this bill is not to add to the liability of the Government, but to
prevent the seizure and detention of our ships, so as to eliminate this
unnecessary loss."5 9
Congress did not address in the SIAA the question of claims for
damages caused by public vessels.60 An attempt to include a provision
addressing this problem failed because legislators considered such an
expansion of the government's liability too drastic to be included in
what was considered an emergency bill to solve a narrow problem.61
Failure to provide for the problem of damages caused by public vessels
led to a stream of private relief bills for such damages,62 and in 1925
Congress responded by enacting the PVA.6 3 The House Report64 speci-
fled that the main purpose of the PVA was to allow submission of ad-
miralty claims to the courts, eliminating the need for Congress to spend
time and energy on private relief bills, thereby achieving faster and
more effective resolution of the claims.65
The House Report on the PVA discussed the -general question of
sovereign immunity, reviewing the progressively more extensive waiv-
ers made by Congress since the founding of the Republic. 66 The histor-
ical movement, the report noted, was toward greater equality between
the state and the individual before the law.67 This perspective is tem-
pered, however, by the report's discussion of Walton v. United States,68
an 1889 Court of Claims case discussing the proper scope of sovereign
immunity, which is cited as support for the waiver of immunity in the
PVA. The Walton court noted that the government's immunity should
not extend to situations in which it engages in an enterprise for profit or
58. S. REP. No. 223, supra note 55, at 3. One of the reasons for the development in admiralty
law of the maritime lien and in rem proceedings was to ensure that the court had control of
property that could be used to pay a judgment. See G. GiLMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 52, at
35-36.
59. H.R. REP. No. 497, supra note 53, at 3.
60. For a discussion of the meaning of the term "public vessels," see note 6 supra.
61. The House Report commented: "To authorize suits against the United States for dam-
ages occasioned by any public vessel. . . would involve a [r]adical change "in the policy this
Government has heretofore pursued.... H.R. REP. No. 497, supra note 53, at 4.
62. See H.R. REP. No. 913, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
63. Pub. L. No. 68-546,43 Stat. 1112 (1925) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1976)).
64. H.R. REP. No. 913, supra note 62.
65. Id at 1-2. The Act provides that a "libel in personam in admiralty may be.brought
against the United States ... for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States:' Pub.
L. No. 68-546, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1976)).
66. H.R. REP. No. 913, supra note 62, at 4-6.
67. Id at 3-4.
68. 24 Ct. Cl. 372 (1889).
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to situations in which it operates its property on equal terms with the
general citizenry.6 9 The latter situation includes the operation of ves-
sels in navigable waters. An important caveat, however, to this view
supporting the waiver of immunity is that the government, according to
the Walton court, should not be liable "'for loss or damage occasioned
to private citizens by reason of any imperfection in the performance of
the ordinary functions of Government, or by reason of the acts, omis-
sions, or negligence of its officers or agents in the discharge of such
functions.' 70 This statement reflects Congress's perception of the
waivers of immunity in both the SIAA and the lPVA 71 as waivers that
are directed at specific problems involving ships operating in navigable
waters72 and its perception that such waivers are not intended to reach
broader governmental decisions.
B. The History of the 1960 Amendments to the SIAA.
The SIAA remained in its original form, with minor modifica-
tions,73 until 1960. The primary intent behind the 1960 amendments
was to solve jurisdictional problems between the SIAA and the Tucker
Act.74 The Tucker Act provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the Court
69. Id at 379 (quoting from an unidentified Senate Report), cited with approval in H.R. REP.
No. 913, supra note 62, at 3. In Walton Congress had passed a special bill authorizing the Court
of Claims to take jurisdiction over the claims of an owner of a river steamer and barges whose
vessels had sunk following a collision with unlit government piers on the Ohio River. The court
relied on the congressional reports in interpreting the scope of the waiver of immunity in the bill
giving the court jurisdiction of the case. 24 Ct. Cl. at 377-80.
70. 24 Ct. Cl. at 379, quoted with approval in H.R. REP. No. 913, supra note 62, at 3.
71. See H.R. REP. No. 913, supra note 62, at 3; S. REP. No. 223, supra note 55, at 3; H.R.
REP. No. 497, supra note 53, at 1-3.
72. Before the 1960 amendments, the significant cases interpreting the SIAA and the PVA
dealt with the handling of vessels and their cargoes. For example, the PVA's coverage of noncoll-
sion damage was the subject of debate until 1945 when the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945). The case arose after a merchant
ship was ordered to follow a small naval vessel into the Delaware Bay. The naval vessel led the
merchant ship over a submerged wreck, damaging the merchant ship. Because there had been no
collision between the naval vessel and the merchant ship, the government argued that the suit was
outside the purview of the PVA. The Court held that although the bill had originally been limited
to collision damage, Congress had consciously changed the statute's wording before its enactment;
hence, the PVA included actions for damages from public vessels even if there was no collision.
1d at 224-25. See also American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947) (holding the PVA
makes the government liable for personal injuries sustained on a public vessel).
73. See, eg., Act of Dec. 13, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-877, 64 Stat. 1112 (amending 46 U.S.C.
§ 745 (1950)) (extending the time limit in which to bring certain actions); Act of June 30, 1932,
Pub. L. No. 72-213, 47 Stat. 420 (providing a saving clause for those who had claims pending in
other courts when the Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. United States Shipping Bd. Emer-
gency Fleet Corp., 280 U.S. 320 (1930), that the SIAA provides the exclusive remedy for claims
against the Emergency Shipping Board).
74. See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
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of Claims for contract claims against the government in excess of
$10,000. 7 5 The SIAA and the PVA provided that federal district courts
had exclusive jurisdiction over any claim against the United States
sounding in admiralty.76 This situation posed a dilemma for the indi-
vidual with a contract claim exceeding $10,000 that was based on some
type of maritime transaction, for a suit filed in the wrong court could
not be transferred to the proper forum; rather, it had to be dismissed
and re-filed. 77 Additionally, the commencement of an action under
one statute did not toll the statute of limitations of the other statute.
Considering the SIAA's two-year statute of limitations,78 it was con-
ceivable that an action originally brought under the Tucker Act79 that
was deemed to involve an admiralty question would be dismissed by
the Court of Claims although it was time barred in the district court.
Adding to this confusion was the uncertainty over classifying ves-
sels as "employed as a merchant vessel" or employed as a "public ves-
sel." This classification determined whether an action could be
brought under the SIAA or the PVA. Additionally, because a vessel
conceivably could not be "employed as a merchant vessel" and still
escape classification as a "public vessel,"' 0 all contract claims involving
such a vessel came under the purview of the Tucker Act,81 and all tort
claims were covered by the FTCA. This confusion frequently caused
lawyers to proceed under an incorrect statute in an improper forum,82
75. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (Supp. III 1979).
76. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 742, 782 (1958) (§ 742 amended 1960).
77. See S. REP. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960), reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3583, 3584. A suit could not be filed simultaneously in the district court and in the
Court of Claims because the latter court had no jurisdiction of a claim pending in another court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (1976).
78. 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1976).
79. The Tucker Act has a six-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1976).
80. The confusion is illustrated in Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 243
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), rev'dsub nom., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Scott, 197 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1952), vacated
sub nom., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446 (1953). In Calmar the government
chartered a private merchant ship to transport war supplies. Enemy aircraft sank the ship. The
district court took jurisdiction under the SIAA, implying that the PVA was inapplicable because
the ship was privately owned and operated. 103 F. Supp. at 262-63. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, holding that because the ship was carrying war material it was not "em-
ployed as a merchant vessel." 197 F.2d at 801. The Supreme Court held that the nature of the
cargo was irrelevant and that the claim was properly considered under the SIAA. 345 U.S. at 447,
455-56.
81. Claims for amounts exceeding $10,000 came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (Supp. II 1979).
82. See S. REP. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960), reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3583, 3584.
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with potentially disastrous effects resulting from the different statutes of
limitations. 83
The solution to these problems was twofold. First, Congress gave
the Court of Claims and district courts authority to transfer cases to
one another if a case exclusively within the jurisdiction of one court
was filed in the wrong court, but only if it was in the "interest of jus-
tice" to do so.84 Second, the SIAA was amended so that the phrase "or
if a private person or property were involved" was substituted for the
original, more restrictive clause, "provided that such vessel is employed
as a merchant vessel or as a tugboat operated by such corporation." 85
There is little legislative history concerning the latter change, but the
material that does exist indicates that this alteration also was made to
clarify the scope of the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts. 86
83. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
84. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(c), 1506 (1976). The phrase "in the interest ofjustice" was added
on the advice of the Secretary of Commerce to give courts the discretion to dismiss cases with
prejudice if it appeared the case had been purposely filed in the wrong court in bad faith. See S.
REP. No. 1894, supra note 82, at 9-10, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3590.
85. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-770, § 3, 74 Stat. 912 (amending 46 U.S.C. § 742
(1958)). The other changes involved the rewording of existing sentences, such as substituting
"owned or possessed" for "owned and possessed" and "any appropriate nonjury proceeding" for
"at the time of the commencement of the action herein provided for, a libel." Id
86. See S. REp. No. 1894, supra note 82, at 5, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3585-86. The changes in the SIAA reflected the thoughts expressed in a letter that had been
written to the Judiciary Committee by the Secretary of Commerce. The changes were to "go to
the fundamentals" of the jurisdictional problem:
We believe that the Suits in Admiralty Act (sec. 2 thereof) should be amended to clarify
the jurisdiction of the district courts over suits arising under the Suits in Admiralty Act
to provide jurisdiction for proceedings in personam against the United States or corpora-
tions owned by the United States in respect of cases where a proceeding in admiralty
could be maintained if a private person, vessel, cargo or other property was involved.
The present language in the first sentence of section 2 of.. .[the Suits in Admiralty
Act]... has given rise to judicial problems which involve questions ofjurisdiction and
uncertainties as to the proper forum about which proponents of the bill complain.
Id at 10, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 3590-91.
The Senate report on the bill notes that the Senate intended the change in the SIAA to clarify
the statute's confusing language. See id at 5, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3586. The report cites several cases that demonstrate the varied results of different interpretations
of the words "cargo" and "merchant vessel." For example, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. United
States, 175 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1949), the court decided that barrels of flammable material awaiting
loading onto a government ship were not "cargo" within the purview of the SIAA; hence, the
government was not liable for any damage caused when the flammable material ignited, damag-
ing adjacent ships. In Eastern S.S. Lines v. United States, 187 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1951), the court
held that use of a chartered ship as a hospital ship was employment of the ship as a public vessel,
not as a "merchant vesseL" and thus the costs to the owner of reconverting the ship to merchant
use were not recoverable under the SIAA.
The SIAA has been amended once since the 1960 amendments. Act of Aug. 29, 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-417, § 3, 86 Stat. 654 (amending 46 U.S.C. § 749 (1970)). The purpose of the amendment
is to use the same jurisdictional language of the 1960 amendments for the sections allowing the
secretaries of the military departments to settle admiralty claims against the government through
administrative processes. See S. REP. No. 1079, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3129, 3129. The legislative history of the 1972 change merely reiterates
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The primary impact of the changes in the SIAA has been to ex-
pand the Act's coverage from torts inflicted by or on a vessel to all
maritime torts.87 The effect of this change is to place certain maritime
tort claims that previously had been cognizable only under the FTCA
within the purview of the SIAA.88
C. Judicial Interpretation of the 1960 Amendments to the SIAA.
The Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the effect of the 1960
amendments on the SIAA and the PVA. In United States v. United
Continental Tuna Corp. 8 9 the Court refused to interpret the 1960
amendments as making the SIAA coextensive with the PVA. A Philip-
pine corporation, seeking damages for a fishing boat that was sunk in a
collision with a United States warship, brought suit under both the
SIAA and the PVA. The district court held that the case was governed
by the PVA because a warship had caused the damage.90 Under the
PVA, a foreign national cannot bring suit unless his government has
waived its immunity from similar suits by United States citizens.91 Be-
cause this condition was not satisfied, the district court dismissed the
case.92 The claimant appealed, contending that the SIAA, its scope
broadened by the 1960 amendments, now also covered cases involving
public vessels. Although the appellate court accepted this argument, 93
the Supreme Court, after reviewing the legislative history of the SIAA
that of the 1960 amendments: the change includes the "private person or property" language to
clarify the confusion surrounding the law defining the jurisdiction of the district courts. Id at 5,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 3133-34. Statements that the legislature makes
after a law has been enacted are not, of course, determinative of congresional intent. See Rich-
mond Marine Panama, S.A. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1210, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), cited with
approval in Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1974). But in referring to the
1960 amendments in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, Congress focused on the
amendments' solution of jurisdictional problems, not on their substantive changes to the United
States' liability for maritime torts.
87. For a succinct discussion of current admiralty law and of interpretations of maritime
torts, see National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1078, 1080-82 (M.D. Tenn.
1977); Conner, Maritime Tort Liability of the United States, 11 J. MAR. L. & COM. 271 (1980).
88. See United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 176 n.14 (1976); Kelly
v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1149 (2d Cir. 1976); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 525-
26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Brown v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 472, 474
(C.D. Cal. 1975). But see McCormick v. United States, 645 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1981); Teich v.
United States, 500 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (finding the Coast Guard negligent in the place-
ment of navigation aids under the FTCA without discussion of the applicability of the SIAA).
89. 425 U.S. 164 (1976).
90. Id at 166 (district court case not reported).
91. 46 U.S.C. § 785 (1976).
92. See 425 U.S. at 166 (district court case not reported).
93. See United Continental Tuna Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 774, 777-78 (9th Cir.
1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 164 (1976). The plaintiff corporation argued that the "any private person"
language of the amendment is so broad that it enables one to avoid the PVA and its restrictions
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and its 1960 amendments, concluded that the amendments were moti-
vated by the "severe jurisdictional problems" attendant to filing a mari-
time claim. 94 Noting that it is "a cardinal principle of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored,"' 95 the Court
rejected a broad interpretation of the SIAA amendments that would
have effectively stripped the jurisdictional provisions of the PVA of
their vitality, and held that the case had been properly dismissed for
failure to meet the PVA reciprocity provisions. 96
The background of the SIAA indicates that it was narrowly drawn
to address two problems: the seizure of government vessels and the
necessity of congressional disposition through private relief bills of
maritime claims against the government. 97 The 1960 amendments also
were designed to respond to a discrete problem, that of jurisdictional
confusion over the processing of admiralty claims.98 There is little
question that the 1960 amendments effectively broadened the coverage
of the SIAA to include maritime torts that previously could have been
brought only under the FTCA.99 The history of the SIAA provides,
however, no definitive answer to the question of whether a substantive
change of immunity was intended to affect those claims that the SIAA
had come to embrace. The indications are that no such change was
contemplated. The rationale and the application of the discretionary-
function exemption of the FTCA further supports this view.
D. The Discretionary-Function Exemption of the FTCA.
1. Legislative history. The FTCA's enactment in 1946100 reflected
thirty years of attempts to enact a general waiver of the government's
immunity for tort actions.10' The FTCA is not, however, an absolute
waiver of sovereign immunity; it provides for specific exemptions to the
waiver. 0 2 The most important exemption is the "discretionary-func-
entirely, but does not preclude one from bringing suit under the PVA if its provisions are more
favorable than those of the SIAA. See 499 F.2d at 778.
94. 425 U.S. at 172.
95. Id at 168.
96. Id at 181.
97. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 84-86 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
100. See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. iv., 60 Stat. 812, 842
(codified in scattered sections of 28, 31, 33 U.S.C.).
101. See 2 L. JAYsoN, supra note 11, §§ 5, 246. For a discussion of the progressively broader
waivers of government immunity prior to the enactment of the FTCA, see Id §§ 52-55.
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
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tion" exemption,10 3 which provides that the waiver of immunity does
not apply to
[any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government ... based upon the exercise or performance or the fail-
ure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.0 4
The discretionary-function exemption limits the analogy in the
FTCA between government liability and private liability.10 5 The gen-
erally accepted reason for this limitation is to restrict judicial review
and supervision of policy decisions made by the coordinate branches of
government.10 6 The discretionary-function exemption, founded in the
common law,107 evinces respect for the doctrine of separation of
powers.108
The legislative history of the FTCA's discretionary-function ex-
emption contains a straightforward description of the situations in
which the exemption may apply. 0 9 A more revealing and frequently
cited 10 statement about the nature of the exemption was made by the
Justice Department Assistant Attorney General in hearings before the
House Judiciary Committee."1 In discussing the inclusion of the dis-
cretionary-function clause, he remarked: "It is not probable that the
courts would extend a Tort Claims Act into the realm of the validity of
legislation or discretionary administrative action, but [this bill] makes
this specific."112 Many courts, including the Supreme Court,"13 have
found this statement indicative of Congress's understanding of the ex-
emption as a fundamental precept based on the separation of powers
doctrine, that had been added only for clarity.
103. Id § 2680(a). See S. REP. No. 1196,77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1942) (describing this exemp-
tion as the "most important" one). The 1942 draft contains the same discretionary-function lan-
guage that was finally enacted in the FTCA. See 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 11, § 246.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
105. 2 L. JAYsON, supra note 11, § 245. See S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 103, at 7. The
Senate report mentions several activities for which immunity was not waived, such as flood-con-
trol projects and regulatory decisions by the FTC or the SEC. Instead, the Act was intended to
reach the common law torts of employees such as automobile collisions caused by negligence. Id
106. See 3 K. DAvIs, supra note 11, § 25.13; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ACTION 259 (1965).
107. See 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 11, § 248.01; Zillman, supra note 11, at 16-30.
108. See notes 126-31 infra and accompanying text.
109. See note 105 supra.
110. See, e.g., Laird v, Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 801 (1972); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
27 (1953); Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 1980 A.M.C. 2103, 2110 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
111. See Hearings on H.A 5373 and 6463 Before the House Judiciary Comm, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (1942) (statement of Francis M. Shea).
112. Id
113. See note 110 supra.
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2. Judicial development. Dalehite v. United States114 contains the
Supreme Court's most extensive analysis of the FTCA's discretionary-
function exemption. Dalehite arose from a disastrous explosion in
Texas City, Texas, in 1947 that killed 560 persons, injured over 3000
persons, demolished three ships in a port, and resulted in over one mil-
lion dollars of property damage. 115 The tragedy occurred when gov-
ernment-produced fertilizer that had been loaded aboard ships for
export to war-torn European countries detonated. The district court
held the government negligent in drafting and adopting the fertilizer-
export plan, in manufacturing the fertilizer, and in failing to police ade-
quately the loading of the fertilizer aboard the ships. 116
The Supreme Court held that all of the government's allegedly
negligent activities were immune under the discretionary-function ex-
emption of the FTCA.117 The government's discretionary function, the
Court reasoned, covers more than the initiation of government pro-
grams and activities at the highest executive levels. In the Court's
words, "[w]here there is room for policy judgment and decision there is
discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying
out the operations of government in accordance with official directions
cannot be actionable."'1 18 The Court, in dicta, noted that the chal-
lenged government actions were "made at a planning rather than oper-
ational level" 1 19 and were properly within the protective embrace of the
exemption.120
Dalehite represents the furthest reach of the discretionary-function
exemption, and although its facts may be unique, 121 the plan-
ning/operational dichotomy continues to be important in analyzing
114. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
115. See id at 48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
116. 1950 A.M.C. 1084, 1084 (S.D. Tex. 1950), rev'dsub nom. In re Texas City Disaster Liti-
gation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952), af'dsub nom. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
117. 346 U.S. at 37-44.
118. Id at 36.
119. Id at 42.
120. Justice Jackson, joined by two other Justices, dissented, contending that the discretion-
ary-function exemption had been interpreted too broadly. In essence, the dissenting Justices be-
lieved that the details of the fertilizer-export program had been carried out carelessly and that this
lack of care was not covered by the discretionary-function exemption. The dissent noted that a
broad reading of the discretionary-function exemption emasculates the FTCA. The old adage
"The King can do no wrong" becomes "The King can do only little wrongs." Id at 60 (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
1 121. Several commentators have noted that the mass disaster nature of the incident, its poten-
tial for huge fnancial liability, and concern over the decision's impact on the post-war foreign aid
program may have caused the Court to interpret the discretionary-function clause broadly. See
Reynolds, supra note 11, at 97; Zillman, supra note 11, at 6-8.
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discretionary-function cases. 122 The standard, however, has been criti-
cized as imputing a test that is not justified by the words or the legisla-
tive history of the statute.123 An additional criticism is that such a
standard merely shifts the controversy from defining "discretion" to
identifying what is a planning-level decision and what is an operation-
level decision. 124 Nevertheless, the standard is useful. Too broad an
interpretation of discretion would allow the exception to swallow the
rule, for every action by an employee is to some degree discretionary.
Too narrow an interpretation would subject all decisions of govern-
ment to the possibility of an endless treadmill of litigation. The plan-
ning/operational approach is sufficiently flexible to protect decisions of
government that should be exempt from judicial review in accordance
with the separation of powers doctrine,1 25 yet still to allow citizens to
recover when wronged by negligent government implementation of a
policy.
III. THE DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION ExEMPTION AND THE SIAA
A. Separation of Powers.
Separation of powers is one of the cornerstone concepts of our
constitutional system. Inherent in this constitutional framework is the
accountability of the legislative and executive branches to the electo-
rate. Elected representatives in the legislative and executive branches
of government must make the sometimes difficult policy decisions re-
garding government programs and the allocation of resources. In addi-
tion, executive agencies must plan, decide on, and implement
government policies.126 The executive branch, for example, loses some
of its independence when its policy decisions are subject to judicial re-
view or supervision. The apprehension of judicial scrutiny may inhibit
the implementation of innovative approaches to problems, to the detri-
ment of the public.'27
Courts are ill-equipped to balance the various concerns necessary
in formulating governmental policy or to make decisions about the
most efficient allocation of resources. The courtroom processes are bet-
122. See 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 11, § 249.07.
123. Id
124. Id
125. See generally 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 11, § 249.07.
126. Improper implementation of a predetermined policy does not, however, merit protection
under the discretionary-function exemption.
127. Reynolds, supra note 11, at 121-22. See also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d
Cir. 1949) (Judge Learned Hand, in discussing the need for immunity for federal officials, argued
that the burden of lawsuits "would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.").
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ter suited to the application of a principle to a given set of facts rather
than to the formulation of policy for major governmental undertakings
that affect a multitude of people in a wide variety of situations across
the country. Such decisions frequently require technical expertise in a
variety of disciplines. The judiciary usually cannot consistently attain
the desired depth of knowledge in any field because of the wide variety
of cases that must be heard.128 In addition, the judiciary is further re-
moved from the demands of the electorate than are the legislative and
executive branches. 129
Scarce man power and financial resources accentuate the judici-
ary's inability to make the best policy decisions. Because a court is
constrained by the facts of the case before it, it may too easily render a
decision without full appreciation of the consequences. An apparently
just result in one case may have an adverse impact on a larger scale. As
the court noted inMagno v. Corros,130 in which the plaintiff boat owner
asserted that the Coast Guard should have installed more lights along a
dike, "[e]very dollar of [the Coast Guard's] money that we direct it to
spend is diverted from another regulatory activity."' 31 A court simply
does not have the depth of expertise and sufficient data before it to
evaluate effectively all of the countervailing considerations. For exam-
ple, consideration of the other regulatory functions that an agency must
perform, may not be properly before a court when it applies a principle
of law to the facts of the case. To avoid the danger that far-reaching
policy decisions will be made by courts, discretionary-policy decisions
should be immune from scrutiny in the courtroom.
B. The Legislative History of the 1960 Amendments.
The legislative history of the 1960 amendments reveals no congres-
sional intent to change the substantive liability of the United States for
maritime torts. The Supreme Court recognized the limited purpose of
the 1960 amendments-to resolve jurisdictional disputes-in United
States v. United Continental Tuna Corp. 132 The only possible basis to
interpret the amendments as effecting a substantive change in the
waiver of immunity is to adopt the notion that all waivers of sovereign
128. See generally D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-67 (1977). Courts do,
obviously, rely on information from different disciplines in trying and deciding cases. The differ-
ence, however, is in the scope of the task and the need for managerial talent to formulate govern-
mental policy by effectively balancing speculation as to future developments, present priorities,
and past experience.
129. See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 121-22.
130. 630 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
131. Id. at 229.
132. 425 U.S. 164 (1976). See notes 89-96 supra and accompanying text.
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immunity are to be given the broadest possible reading, as evidenced in
the Lane v. United States133 and DeBardeleben Marine Corp. v. United
States1 34 decisions. But there is no consistent view on this point in
American jurisprudence; both narrow and broad constructions have
appeared in cases. 135 Both viewpoints rely strongly on glib phrases 136
that are of little assistance in analyzing the problem. It is more helpful
to analyze each question in light of basic policies such as the separation
of powers doctrine and governmental goals as expressed by Congress.
Historically, Congress has progressively expanded the government's
waiver of immunity.137 Yet, Congress has been restrained in recogniz-
ing the government's liability for the acts of public officials exercising
their policymaking judgment.1 38 Thus, the better approach is to as-
sume there is immunity from liability for discretionary functions unless
the statutory language explicitly provides otherwise.
Immunity-waiver statutes also should not be interpreted inconsis-
tently.1 39 Cases that have considered whether the SIAA contains a dis-
cretionary-function exemption have involved maritime tort actions that
formerly could have been brought only under the FTCA, which clearly
contains a discretionary-function exemption. It is anomalous for the
jurisdictional modification contained in the 1960 amendments to effect
a different outcome for suits formerly barred under the FTCA's discre-
tionary-function exemption and now cognizable under the SIAA.140
Congress expressed no intent to modify the treatment of such cases.
133. 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975). For a discussioh of this case, see notes 19-21 supra and
accompanying text.
134. 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of this case, see notes 22-24 supra and
accompanying text. See generally Comment, The Discretionary Function Exemptions and the Suits
inAdmiraltyAct: A Safe Harborfor Negligence?, 4 U. PUG Er SOUND L. Rav. 385 (1981); 13 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1546, 1551 (1972).
135. Compare United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 (1951) (broad interpretation
of waiver of immunity in the FTCA) and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Panama Canal Co., 407 F.2d 24, 28
(5th Cir. 1969) (broad reading of the FTCA) with United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590
(1941) (narrow construction of the Tucker Act) and Blanco v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 927, 931
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (narrow reading of the SIAA/PVA).
136. See, e.g., DeBardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir. 1971)
( The tide of history is running clearly against the concept of sovereign immunity.").
137. See 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 11, §§ 51-64.
138. See notes 69-70, 102-05 supra and accompanying text.
139. See United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1976); Laird
v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972).
140. Cf. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (in an action under the FTCA for damages
caused by a sonic boom, the government could not be held absolutely liable under a theory of
engaging in inherently dangerous activities; nor could it be held liable under a trespass theory-to
allow the trespass theory to succeed when the absolute liability argument had failed "would be to




The reasoning of courts that have refused to recognize a discre-
tionary-function exemption in the SIAA is simple: because the statute
does not provide for a discretionary-function exemption, none exists.
This analysis reflects an attitude that favors the broadest possible read-
ing of any waiver of the government's sovereign immunity. This atti-
tude is consonant with the historical progression away from sovereign
immunity and toward greater liability of the government for its actions.
There are, however, further considerations. The first is recognition
of the separation of powers doctrine. Courts that have recognized a
discretionary-function exemption maintain that courts do not have the
inherent power to review the discretionary decisions of a coordinate
branch of government, and they readily infer a discretionary-function
exemption into the SIAA. The second consideration is the legislative
history of the 1960 amendments to the SIAA. The legislative history
indicates that Congress did not intend to alter the outcome of maritime
tort claims previously cognizable under only the FTCA by removing
the discretionary-function exemption to the waiver of immunity for
such torts.
The appropriate course for the courts to follow is to imply the dis-
cretionary-function exemption into the SIAA. Implying this exemption
offers the best balance between affording an injured party the opportu-
nity to recover for government negligence in the implementation of a
program or policy and restricting the judiciary from impeding poli-
cies--or worse, making its own policies-that are properly the respon-
sibility of coordinate branches of government.
Donald S. Ingraham
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